INTRODUCTION

Corruption is a universal phenomenon. It is not something new either. Corruption in One form or another existed since time immemorial. A review of penal codes utilized In various ancient civilizations clearly demonstrate that bribery was a serious problem Among the Jews, the Chinese, the Japanese, the Greeks, the Romans as well as theaters of the New World.In ancient India large-scale corruption Dominated public life (Thakur, 1979:12).As has been observed "corruption prevailed on a larger scale in India during the ancient period and the ones that followed"(Padhay 1986:26). From this one can assume the nature and scale in the increase of Corruption from medieval to the present time in the countries of the Indian Sub-continent. One of the greatest evils of medieval administration in India was the Extortion of perquisites and presents (Sarkar, 1935:83). Corruption was evident during the British rule in India. There was almost regular and systematic corruption involving almost all officials at different levels in the political and administrative hierarchy. There was an underlying belief among officials of "making hay while the sun of British Raj shone" (Dwivedi and Bhargava, 1967:7).

Corruption is a topic of interest and concern in academic circles, in the media, among people of different professions, within the civil service, among members of parliament, politicians, government officials, members of the business and financial communities, students, foreign investors, aid agencies and non-governmental organizations. In other words, the term corruption is not new to Bangladesh. A general impression conveyed by the media and by popular discourse is that among ordinary people in Bangladesh; corruption is viewed quite clearly as 'a way of life'. A recent survey carried out by the Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad reinforces that impression: the survey found, among other significant data, that 95 per cent of respondents believed that the police were the most Corrupt department in the land, followed very closely by the customs, the department of excise and taxation, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary. A solid 62 per cent of respondents believed that the primary responsibility for corruption in Bangladesh lay in the hands of government officials. The extent to which public sector corruption has become accepted as 'a way of life' in Bangladesh is challenging in its implications. A recently published feature on corruption in a leading weekend magazine, entitled, 'Corruption of Politics and Politics of Corruption' consisted of a virtual litany of dubious deals, underhand agreements and blatantly corrupt acts by political leaders and parties in Bangladesh, from the infamous regime of H.M Ershad, to the present leadership as well. But surprisingly, both the media report and the research conducted by the Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad, upon which it was partly based, appear to have generated little reaction. Certainly, there were no reports of a public outcry, not even a barrage of letters or telephone calls in response to these successive and extremely challenging expressions of public opinion and media analysis.

Does this mean that the people of Bangladesh are unmoved by the all-pervasive level of Corruption in their polity? Or have they become so immune to its horrors, so cynical about what they perceive to be the unhappy reality of their lives that they have ceased to care? Whatever the reasons, people appear extremely reluctant to believe that anything can be done about corruption. Perhaps this is one reason for a marked absence of objective, analytical literature on corruption as a social exchange or process. There are, of course, other reasons. But generally speaking, there is a tendency to focus on the enormity of the problem, on the normative aspects of corruption, on the (undoubtedly) negative impact of corruption and indeed, to perpetuate the notion that corruption is its own culprit. The media report mentioned above, for instance, states at the outset that 'Corruption, in our view, lies at the root of the overall degeneration of politics and of a section of our politicians that we see today.' Thus, corruption is seen both as the root and as the effect of a situation, with the result that its salient features are often masked and its behavioral patterns difficult to discern. Indeed, as far as Bangladesh is concerned, little is known about the manner in which corruption occurs, the process by which, presumably, it grows and flourishes the conditions which are conducive to its existence and the structures which support its survival. Little is known about corruption as a process, as practice and as structural outcome. It can be said, therefore, that there is inconsequential independent appraisal of corruption as a social phenomenon in this country. Whatever independent or neutral discussion has been generated tends to focus mainly on the political or economic aspects of corruption. Certainly, very few academic works have been devoted towards obtaining empirically sound, theoretical analyses of the subject from a sociological perspective with special reference to Bangladesh.

This Study will, it is hoped, redress the lack in several ways. A major aim of this Study has been to seek out works with a sociological perspective of public sector corruption in Bangladesh. As the Study will bear out, the search has been disappointing in the sense that only a few works of specific relevance have been found. Consequently, the challenge has been to identify and analyze the literature available, from a sociological perspective. Many works on the political or economic aspects of Bangladesh do contain data on social issues in general and corruption in particular and hence, such works have been included as sources on public sector corruption.

DEFINING CORRUPTION

Defining corruption is also important in the context of global efforts to reduce its influence in public life. But that is not an easy task. Corruption is a social, legal, economic and political concept enmeshed in ambiguity and consequently encouraging controversy. The ambiguity and controversy result from the fact that a number of competing approaches to understanding corruption is available. Naturally, definitions of corruption focus on one of several aspects of the phenomenon. Various approaches to corruption can be placed into five groups. These are public-interest-centered, market-centered, public-office-centered, public-opinion-centered and legalistic. Proponents of the public-interest-centered approach believe that corruption is in some way injurious to or destructive of public interest (Rogow and Laswell, 1970:54). Market-centered enthusiasts suggest that norms governing public office have shifted from a mandatory pricing model to a free-market model, thereby considerably changing the nature of corruption (Tilman, 1970:62-64). Public-office-centered protagonists stress the fact that misuse by incumbents of public office for private gain is corruption (Theobald, 1990:2). Those who believe in public-opinion-centered definitions of corruption emphasize the perspectives of public opinion about the conduct of politicians, government and probity of public servants (Leys, 1970:31-37). Others have suggested looking at corruption purely in terms of legal criteria in view of the problems inherent in determining rules and norms which govern public interest, behavior and authority (Scott, 1972). The five approaches, as discussed above, have concentrated on the nature of corruption. Though the approaches throw some light they do not clarify the meaning of corruption to any satisfaction. Now there are four divergent views on the definition of corruption. The definitions have come from moralists, functionalists, social casuists and social constructionist realists. The moralists view "corruption as an immoral and unethical phenomenon that contains a set of moral aberrations from moral standards of society, causing loss of respect for and confidence in duly constituted authority" (Gould, 1991:468). One of the well-known proponents of this view, Nye, portrays corruption as "a behavior that deviates from the formal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains, or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence" )(Nye, 1997:417). But this way of defining corruption suffers from a number of limitations. It tends to individualize a societal phenomenon and attempts to dichotomize as to what is good and what is bad. In the process societal contexts are ignored and the gap between formal norms and the underlying practice-girded norms are not analysed (Caiden and Caiden, 1977). The functionalists usually look at corruption in terms of the actual function that it plays in socio-economic development. Claims are made by functionalists that corruption flourishes as a substitute for the market system; offers an acceptable alternative to violence; increases public participation in public policy (Leff, 1979; Gould, 1980). Some functionalists believe that political and bureaucratic leaders may see a national interest in actively pursuing or tolerating a certain degree of administrative corruption (Klitgaard, 1988). The major criticisms against functionalists are that they ignore the political significance of deviance and lack any consideration of power, interest and social structure in their analyses and at the sametime the whole question of the origins of corruption is not considered (Lo, 1993:3). The two comparatively recent perspectives, i.e., social censure and social construction reality, view corruption radically differently from the other two approaches, i.e. moralists and functionalists. Both the approaches tend to look at corruption from a broad societal perspective. The proponents of social censure believe that in understanding corruption one should take into consideration the capacity of the state to produce a particular form of social relations and shift the theoretical emphasis to the interplay of law, ideologies and political economy (Lo, 1993:5). On the other hand, social construction reality views corruption as problematic and the actors involved can be studied by relating them to contextual information on their social positions, interests and stakes in the system as well as on the political, economic and social conditions within which they function (Pavorala, 1996:25). In view of the multitude of approaches and views on corruption it is not easy to agree on a unanimous definition of the term. Two definitions of corruption can prove handy. The shorter definition of corruption includes "abuse of authority, bribery, favoritism, extortion, fraud, patronage, theft, deceit, malfeasance and illegality" (Caiden, 1991a). The broader definition of corruption refers to "use of one’s official position for personal and group gain and that includes unethical actions like bribery, nepotism, patronage, conflict of interest, divided loyalty, influence-peddling, moonlighting, misuse or stealing of government property, selling of favors, receiving kickbacks, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, under- or over-invoicing, court tempering, phony travel and administrative documents and use of regulation as bureaucratic capital (AAPAM, 1991). In conformity with these two definitions of corruption the following definitions of political corruption and administrative corruption are adopted here. Political corruption is "the behavior of (elected) public officials which diverges from the formal components - the duties and powers, rights and obligations - of a public role to seek private gain" (Kramer, 1997). Administrative corruption is defined as "the institutionalized personal abuse of public resources by civil servants" (Gould, 1991). In both cases public officials (elected and appointive) can convert public office into private gain in many ways.

CAUSES OF CORRUPTION

Corruption is a phenomenon that takes place due to the presence of a number of factors. An understanding of such factors requires, among other things, a kind of general framework for a clearer understanding of the causes of corruption, especially from a broader perspective. Genesis of corruption can be explained by looking at three levels - international, national and individual institutional levels (Goudie and Strange, 1997). Competitiveness of international markets provides multinational companies of various sizes with an incentive to offer bribes to gain an advantage over competitors. At the national level basic development strategy of any government moulds opportunities and incentives for corruption. At the same level three relationships - between the government and the civil service, between the government and the judiciary and between the government and the civil society - also affect the nature and discussions of corruption. Three areas of government activity - customs administration, business regulation and management of foreign aid - act as sources of corruption at the level of individual institutions. Corruption also results from the presence of a number of factors. These include: rapid economic and social change, strong kinship and ethnic ties, new institutions, overlapping and sometimes conflicting views about what is proper public behavior, governmental monopoly over economic activities, political softness, widespread poverty and socio-economic inequalities, ignorance, lack of knowledge about individual entitlements, communal bonds, ambivalence towards legitimacy of governmental organizations, asymmetric relationship favoring those in control of state power, economic shortages in which public officials assume extraordinary control over scarce goods and services, greed, patronage and systematic maladministration (Gould and Amar-Reyes, 1985; United Nations, 1990). Most of the above-mentioned factors contributing to corruption can be categorized into "six-fold typology". This typology contains ideological, external, economic, political, socio-cultural and technological variables (Caiden, 1991a). Some of the major reasons as to why people "collude in different ways, rationalize corrupt practices and tolerate corruption in a large scale" are because of the presence of number of factors. These are: governments act as monopolies in many respects, discretion that government and its monopolistic public agencies enjoy in their decision making and allocate roles, lack of effective accountability in government except in the nominal sense of presenting annual audited accounts and reports to parliament or answering questions in the parliament, citizens have limited information about the rules of the game and the standards of service they can expect from public agencies, and exposure of the average citizen to corruption in the public sector tends to be episodic (Paul, 1997a:1350-1351).

SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Sociology is the study of the development, nature and laws of human society. Society, in turn, is a term which describes a mode of life, and includes a range of interests and activities, such as process, organization, structure, human behavior, human relationships, customs, and forms. The term 'sociological', therefore, can be fairly widely applied.

To provide an understanding of corruption from a sociological perspective, it would be necessary to examine, explore and critically analyze corruption as a process of social formation, encompassing corruption in the real world of social structures, institutions and modes of exchange, and at the same time, to also locate and reconcile the reality within an analytical framework which would critically explore the discourse on corruption. This Study aims to approach the subject of public sector corruption in Bangladesh from the sociological perspective by critically examining a selection of literature on the subject, and by seeking through this examination to explore the fundamental processes of the social formation of public sector corruption in Bangladesh - both as a reality, as well as expressed in the literature selected on the subject. Sociological interpretations must take into account social, political and economic forces, both as societal conditions, as well as rhetorical and historical influences which inform the discourse on corruption. It is also important to move beyond dichotomous, normative conclusions and focus instead on corruption as an exchange, as well as behavior, process and outcome. Consequently, the challenge in exploring corruption from this perspective lies essentially in being able to critically focus on the subject of corruption as it exists in Bangladesh, together with the conceptual demands of the dominant discourse on the subject. As will be discussed in some detail in this Study, many of the works under review are informed - either implicitly or explicitly - by an ethnocentric, modernizing ideology, which is not necessarily applicable to the reality of conditions in developing societies like Bangladesh. The significance of these influences is enormous because they reflect the dominant discourse on corruption - especially as an issue of development -- in no uncertain terms. Corruption as behavior, process or activity, is impossible to quantify. Consequently, for social scientists the functional argument which focuses on the 'positive' aspects of public sector corruption necessarily provides only a means of understanding process. Thus, while it might be argued that corruption functions as a useful mechanism to aid social, political or economic exchange, the relevance to social science lies in the process as activity, without reference to its normative qualities. Consequently, while this Study adopts many 'functional' arguments, it does so in a non-judgmental way, the aim being to further the understanding of the process by which corruption takes place in a given situation.

FORMS OF CORRUPTION

Corruption takes many forms. These forms are: acceptance of money and other rewards for awarding contracts, violation of procedures to advance personal interests diversion of public resources for private use, overlooking illegal activities, intervening in the justice process, nepotism, common theft, overpricing, establishing non-existing projects and tax collection and tax assessment frauds (UN, 1990). These many varieties of corruption can be categorized in the public sector further in terms of their nature. Corruption can be foreign-sponsored, institutionalized, outcome of political scandal and administrative malfeasance (Caiden, 1988). In foreign-sponsored corruption the main actors are public officials, politicians, representatives of donor and recipient countries. Bureaucratic elites, politician’s middlemen are responsible for political scandal. Public sector Corruption becomes institutionalized as a result of the support provided by bureaucratic elites, politicians, businessmen and white-collar workers. In administrative malfeasance petty officials and interested individuals play major role. Corruption has been differentiated into three types - collusive, coercive and non-conjunctive (Arora, 1993). In collusive corruption the corruptees themselves are willing and active participants in the process and use of corruption as an instrument for inducing wrong action or inaction on the part of authorities, deriving benefit greater than the costs of corruption on their part. Corruption is forced upon the corrupter by those in the position of power and authority in coercive corruption. In non-conjunctive corruption benefits are obtained at someone else’s cost and victims are unaware of their victimization. Five major strategies - mystification, distancing, folklore, colonization and pacification - have been used by the beneficiaries to protect, promote and sustain corruption in diverse contexts (Arora, 1993).

PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION IN BANGLADESH

Corruption has a deep root in the society in this part of the world. A chapter in Kautilya’s Arthasastra titled "Detection of what is embezzled by government servants out of state revenue" is so vivid and detail that it resembles largely any meticulously prepared official report of today on modes of corruption. Kautilya writing many centuries ago identified forty types of embezzlement comitted by public servants (Padhay, 1986). In ancient India corruption was prevalent in administration, judiciary and trade. As indicated earlier corruption in one form or another became an integral part of politico-administrative systems during the Khilji and Tuglaq dynasties. The situation did not change during the rule of Mughals and the British. Many politicians were charged with corruption and debarred from politics after the promulgation of the first martial law in Pakistan in 1958. Many civil servants, some belonging to the elite Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), were dismissed from their services on corruption changes. It has been argued by some that Bangladesh society is a highly complex network involving reciprocal favors and obligations, and that as a result payoff is the lifeblood of the country (Maloney, 1986:173). Payoff benefits include money, jobs, and luxury gifts, building supplies, overseas travel and the payment of foreign tuition bills, foreign medical bills, overseas hotel and restaurant bills and personal liabilities (Kochanek, 1993:258). The symptoms of patron-client relationship with public service officer are further reflected by the practice of some businessmen to maintain rest houses and high-class exclusive hostesses to entertain important foreign guests and big bosses (Siddiqui, et al. 1990). Many of these big bosses are no doubt top-ranking politicians and senior civil servants.

POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION

Using position while in power to grant undue favor and benefit to one’s relatives, friends and key supporters is a hall-mark of politics in Bangladesh. All the effective rulers have been accused of either direct or indirect involvement in large-scale corruption. During the rule of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib) that lasted little over three-and-a-half years (1972-1975) corruption became a major issue in public discussion. Mujib’s tendency to grant political and financial benefit to his close relatives and associates is well-known. Awami League (AL) activists received jobs in nationalized industries, grew rich as smugglers, appropriated Pakistani houses and sold off government permits and licenses to the highest bidders (Kochanek, 1993). Sheikh Abu Naser, Mujib’s only brother, and four sisters were believed to have benefited excessively from their ties of kinship with Mujib (Franda, 1982). Some of the nouveaux-riches created through the distribution of patronage by the Mujib government were ring leaders of smuggling operations (Maniruzzaman, 1982). Election-related corruption was prominent during Mujib’s rule. Though General Ziaur Rahman (Zia) was not personally involved in corruption, he is credited with institutionalizing corrupt activities (Franda, 1982). It must be said that he instituted legal actions or sacked some ministers on corruption charges, but these people were calling for decentralization in the internal working of his party, i.e. Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Local units of BNP became pockets of corruption. Zia’s failed initiative of Sawnirvar Gram Sarker as the model of "grassroots democracy" was built on loyalty to his party and patronage distribution. During his time corruption and misuse of power resulted in the wastage of almost 40% of the total resources earmarked for development (Kochanek, 1993). Under Zia presidential, parliamentary and local level elections were to some extent manipulated

In favor of his party (Khan and Zafrullah, 1979; Khan 1989a). General Hossain Mohammad Ershad’s (Ershad) government established record levels of venality (Blair, et al., 1992). Ershad’s government was primarily based on calculated and selective patronage distribution to a favored few. In fact, under Ershad corruption prevailed in each and every sector of national life and the forms of corruption included petty corruption, project corruption and programmatic corruption (Kochanek, 1993). Ershad holds the record of totally destroying the credibility of the electoral system of the country. Like Mujib and Zia before him he considered the Election Commission as a normal administrative unit to be used and misused to serve his personal, coterie and party interests. The control of the Election Commission was ensured through the appointment of weak and pliable persons as Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners. Introduction of the upazila system in 1982 not only legitimized and strengthened his rule but at the same time contributed immensely to the spread of corruption to the grassroots and in the process vitiated local development and adversely affected local participation. Politics of patronage and corruption became the order of the day in the delivery of local services. An overwhelming majority (93%) of the respondents in a survey conducted in 1991 and 1992 in two upzilas in the districts of Kurigram and Mymensingh held the view that corruption had increased significantly since the introduction of the upazila system (Siddiquee, 1997). Most respondents in the same survey felt that the upazila council was the nerve centre of corruption, nepotism and patronage networks (Siddiquee, 1997). The study based on survey indicated how upazila councils in study areas extended their patronage networks by: distributing various construction tenders and work orders to their relatives, friends and political allies; leasing out hats, bazaars and jalmahals to their chosen parties; issuing these same people with licenses and permits and selecting the members of their own lobby for various project committees (Siddiquee 1997). During Ershad’s time the politics-business nexus in the arena of corruption became rather prominent. He is known to have received a fixed percentage on any deal involving any amount of money. This contributed to the emergence of a class of fabulously rich people without much effort on their part and who had little understanding of business ethics or norms and adversely affected those who wanted to pursue business in the traditional manner. These new rich people also became prominent in politics as members of parliament and cabinet and eventually some of them became leader of different chambers and other bodies, thereby cementing a close link between politics and business premised on corruption and patronage. One of the outcomes of such a development has been increasing criminalization of politics. Individuals with proven tract records as criminals became an indispensable party in this unholy alliance between Ershad and his promotees in business. It needs to be added that both Mujib and Zia is were instrumental in making individuals with obscure background millionaires. But the difference between Ershad and Mujib and Zia is that the former transgressed all norms, bent rules and broken regulations in order to excessively profit from all state business transactions while the latter operated within limits of civility.

CIVIL SERVENT INFLUENCE IN PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION

Corruption has been and continues to be an integral part of culture. The level of corruption varies depending on how influential a position the particular civil servant holds (Khan, 1997). The civil servants have by and large become accustomed to live a life style far beyond their legal income (Zafarullah, 1987). The citizens have accepted the stark reality that nothing moves without adequately satisfying the concerned civil an opinion survey conducted in 1992 of household heads in Dhaka City found that 68.25% of respondents paid bribes to concerned officials to get services (Aminuzzaman, 1996). The findings of the survey indicated that members of law enforcing agencies, customs and income tax departments were involved in administrative corruption (Aminuzzaman, 1996). Another finding of the survey reaffirmed the commonly held belief that the higher the level of bureaucracy the lower the frequency but higher the amount of bribe; and the lower the level of bureaucracy the higher the frequency but less the amount of bribe (Aminuzzaman, 1996).

The Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad (BUP) only recently conducted an opinion survey of 2197 individuals selected randomly from sixty districts. This survey indicated that 95% of respondents felt that the police department was most corrupt while 82% opined that the secretariat (where most ministries/divisions are located) and the judicial system were most corrupt. In the corruption indicator the customs department came second with 91% of respondents considering its officials extremely corrupt. The officials of the Taxation Department were placed in third position as 90% of the respondents felt they were extremely corrupt (BUP, 1997). Both the surveys reaffirm the ever-widening horizon of administrative corruption. Another survey of people’s opinions at two upazilas in Northern Bangladesh indicated that the then upazila structure was not only controlled by centrally-debuted civil servants posted there but they were involved in misappropriating public funds for their own use (Rahman, 1994). Villagers had to bribe civil servants on a routine basis either to bypass certain access encounters or to speed up the process of service delivery (Rahman, 1994). The surveys as part of three case studies indicated that civil servants' control over massive financial resources without proper accountability and

The self-seeking nature of civil servants was major contributing factors to the growth and sustenance of administrative corruption at the local level (Rahman, 1994). Now one may ask the question as to why such large-scale administrative corruption exists. The reasons for such corruption can be summed up (Khan, 1997). First, civil servants involved in corrupt practices in most cases do not lose their jobs. Very rarely they are dismissed from service on charges pertaining to corruption. Still more rarely they are sent to prison for misusing public funds. They have never been compelled to return to the state their ill-gotten wealth. Second, people have a tendency not only to tolerate corruption but to show admiration to those civil servants who make a fortune through dubious means. The underlying assumption is that it does not matter how one has acquired wealth as long as he has done so. Third, it is easier for a citizen to get quick service because he has already paid the civil servant rather than wait for his turn. Fourth, there is now social acceptance of corruption by public officials. Fifth, barring occasional public procurements, the representatives of the people, i.e. politicians in power, are unwilling to take effective measures to curb corrupt practices in public dealings.

IMPACT OF PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION

Corruption is all-pervasive in Bangladesh. Though corruption has been a part of our politico-administrative heritage, there is little denying the fact that after independence the tentacles of corruption have engulfed the entire society. So strong and sustained is the influence of corruption that most people have come to accept it as a fait accompli. Not only do citizens have accepted it as a part of their daily life experience but more frighteningly they feel themselves powerless to address the phenomenon at any level (Lewis, 1996). The reason for such helplessness is to the presence of corruption in almost all levels of government (World Bank, 1996). The changeover from an authoritarian to a democratic system of government in the 1990s has not had any effect on the nature and dimensions of corruption. Information obtained from the Finance Division of the Ministry of Finance show that over a period of twenty-two years, i.e. between 1971 and 1993, taka 18,000 crore were lost in the public sector due to misappropriation of public funds and theft (Alam, 1996). But this huge amount of money, which is substantial for a resource-poor and aid-dependent country, is only the tip of the iceberg if one takes into consideration all cases of corruption that have been Reported by the Bureau of Anti-Corruption over the same period (Khan, 1997). A government Task Force Report identified a few years back a number of areas where corruption was likely to manifest itself. These areas include: procurement of goods and services including award of contracts by the government; administration of taxes and prevention of smuggling, disposal, sale and allotment of government property include disinvestment of industries and other commercial units; administration of loans by public financial institutions, outright embezzlement of government fund and all kinds of shop-floor malpractices (Ahmed, 1992). It is usually known that almost all kinds of corruption perpetuate in politics and administration in Bangladesh. The most common form of corruption is pecuniary bribes (Taslim, 1994). Other forms of corruption are: abuse of authority, nepotism, favoritism, fraud, patronage, theft and deceit. In many cases forms of corruptions are intertwined with their consequences.

A significant consideration in this discussion must be the impact of corruption and with it, the moral impact of corrupt acts, especially when committed by the state. Although there is considerable debate about the causes of corruption, and also about the manner in which corruption manifests itself, there can be no denying the negative impact of Public sector corruption. True, there are arguments which claim that, under certain circumstances, corruption can be beneficial in oiling the wheels of a rigid, over-regulated economy, in providing a safety-valve from repressive regimes, in overcoming delays caused by administrative hurdles and even in personalizing what would otherwise have been an impersonal and uncaring distribution system. Of the United States which originated in the 1830s, are often used to illustrate the instrumental advantages of corruption (Theobald, 1990). Similarly, it is argued that in the developing world, corruption is a form of indirect taxation which, if removed, would cause bottlenecks which would prevent the smooth functioning of government and business (Consumark Limited, undated, Paper I, p. 17). Furthermore, analysts argue against the assertion that corruption is a waste of resources. They point out the fallacy in the assumption that resources 'diverted' into graft would otherwise have been spent productively, or redistributed to the poor, claiming that resources 'saved' from graft would most likely be spent on luxury items, not on development projects. In other words, in a situation of chronic scarcity which is what exists in the developing world, there would be other ways in which income inequities would be maintained. It is true that under certain circumstances, public sector corruption can provide some instrumental advantages. It is possible that without corruption, administration in many parts of the developing world would - at least temporarily - be impeded. It is also undoubtedly true that under certain

conditions, corruption lends a humanizing aspect to what may otherwise have been an impersonal and rigid exchange. In economic terms there is no difference between illicit and licit goods indeed, as an economic exchange, corruption often stabilizes the business environment, functioning as an important medium through which the logic of the market asserts itself. Examples abound, a well-known one being the case of Brazil where a class of brokers called despachante had emerged entirely to act as intermediaries in a bureaucratic maze which evidently was so complex that in one celebrated case, it required 1470 separate legal actions, 13 government ministries and 50 agencies to obtain a single export license (Theobald, 1990, p. 157 ). Arguments in support of corruption can be applied to many developing societies, where a large bureaucracy is usually so extended and inefficient, that business and trade can only function with the aid of consistent corruption. In Bangladesh, certainly, although corruption is seen to be a serious problem, it is also evident that corruption has its uses. Two works in particular convey the distinct impression that without corruption, business would be paralyzed (Consumark, undated; Quddus, in Ali, et al, 1996). As these studies explain, the plethora of bureaucratic rules and regulations in the country is such that entrepreneurs like an ordinary rickshaw malik (owner) or a garment exporter can survive only by being corrupt. But do these instances imply that we might regard corruption as being beneficial in any way? Granted, that in the absence of exchanges which make the bureaucracy 'flexible', much activity in Bangladesh would come to a halt. But surely the illicit exchange, or the bribe, itself, is not the problem. It is extremely important to realize that the 'benefits' of corruption are, in all likelihood, masking symptoms of a seriously dysfunctional socio-economic or political system. It is more than likely that corruption has emerged because of other, hidden or deep-seated problems or, as is often the case in the developing world, corruption flourishes because structures have been imposed on people without due consideration of their applicability in these environments. Whatever the circumstances or the historical reasons, there is no getting away from the fact that the impact of corruption is negative. Furthermore, although corruption in any form is undesirable, it appears to be considerably less acceptable when the state is corrupt. This is partly because the state presumes upon the membership and loyalty of its citizens - something which a private body does not (cannot) assume. Consequently, because the state has a special position, and is regarded to be a neutral, impartial, and representative body which will provide for and protect the rights of the people, any perversion of this understanding is regarded to be far more serious than if the same act were carried out by a private body. In fact, the behavior of the state is important for other reasons as well. To borrow from another discussion, the behavior of the state is significant because the market cannot be depended upon to be caring - indeed, it is not meant to be a caring organ. As Amartya Sen explains in a discussion on the behaviour of the market during the Irish famine in the 1840s, the reason the market continued to export potatoes to Britain from Ireland during the famine was because the market was not concerned with relative needs - only with relative demand. (Sen, in Abdullah and Khan, (eds) 1996). In Sen's words, the market is an 'organ of alienation' which is neither friendly, nor hostile, simply unconcerned about anything save comparative purchasing powers. (ibid., p. 23, 21). In other words, the market does not care if people starve in a famine or eat in a famine. This

Does not mean that the market is an evil institution, but it implies that someone has to care, especially if the market does not. And that is why the state, in addition to being the only institution which, under given circumstances, can be expected to be moral, also becomes the repository of much human aspiration. This is one reason why, when the state is corrupt, it undermines the moral fabric of society. A pertinent objection to corruption is the reality that it is virtually impossible to confine corruption to those areas, for instance, where its effects are deemed to be desirable. (Theobald, 1990). Consequently, it is safe to conclude as the World Bank did some 15 years ago, that corruption weakens the effectiveness of governments, undermines popular confidence in the public service, and leads to a situation where public servants will do nothing without bribes. The purchase of favors is nothing but an unproductive exercise. Corruption enables the wealthy, the powerful and the unscrupulous, at the expense of law-abiding citizens of a country. (Theobald, 1990) In other words, the general consensus seems to be that although corruption may have some instrumental advantages, it is undesirable in the balance and should be controlled, as far as possible. It may therefore be summarized that even though the definition of corruption as an activity which applies to the misuse of public office continues to have limitations, in the absence of a more acceptable definition, and because the dominant socio-economic and political model of our time is premised on demarcation of the 'public' and the 'private' spheres within a modern nation-state which the popular definition reflects, it is this definition which continues to provide the basis for discussions on corruption. As we have already noted, the dichotomy of 'public' and 'private’ continues to be problematic. How and why this is so can best be explained by examining the historical basis of this definition

PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION CAUSE

HUMAN INSECURITY IN BANGLADESH

Corruption is a key challenge against development, and a major political issue in Bangladesh. Presence of widespread public sector corruption and its debilitating impact in the society, polity and economy are acknowledged by all major political parties - in the Government or outside. At the same time political leaders, from the highest to the lowest levels both in the government and outside, in their public pronouncements commit themselves to fighting corruption and to establishing a corruption free Bangladesh. A glance at the election manifestoes of the major political parties including the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the main opposition party the Awami League (AL) reveals the high level of importance and priority attached to the issue of corruption when they are in power to rule the country.

The ruling BNP during the 2001 national election pledged to establish a “violence and

corruption-free prosperous Bangladesh”.19 According to BNP without eliminating the limitless corruption prevailing in the society and state no effort for development and public welfare would be easy. It promised a number of high priority specific actions for uprooting corruption. These include appointment of an Ombudsman, establishment of an Independent Anti-corruption Commission by restructuring the Bureau of Anti-corruption, establishing transparency and accountability in sales and procurement of public and government-controlled institutions, establishing strict control of any efforts for abuse of influence, and publish accounts of wealth of the Prime Minister, Ministers and all individuals of equivalent status including people’s representatives.

The AL also attached high priority to fighting against corruption placing it in the context of the party’s commitment to establish good governance and pro-people administration that would be accountable to the people, transparent, efficient and honest. The AL promised to set up an “Anti-corruption Council’ aimed at eliminating corruption and setting up an effective constitutional and institutional system. The AL also promised to take necessary firm action to implement recommendations and programs of various international forums including the United Nations in preventing public sector corruption.

Fighting corruption also figures prominently in political commitments of other major Parties. On the other hand there is a growing public concern and discontent about corruption in the country. There can be no disagreement about a national consensus prevailing in the country about the inseparability of the high cost of corruption and the need to combat it with greatest urgency and priority. Corruption has become a key issue of public discourse in recent years not merely because of he debatable annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International which has for the fifth year in a row ranked Bangladesh at the bottom of list, but also for the growing acceptance of corruption as a major political issue by all major political parties and indeed the Government, as well as because of the way corruption affects the lives of the common people – especially those without access to power.

Irrespective of Bangladesh’s position in international ranking in terms of indices such as CPI here is hardly any doubt that corruption is pervasive. The World Bank estimated as early as in 2000hat “if Bangladesh could reduce its public sector corruption level to those prevailing in countries with highest reputation for honest dealing it could add between 2.1 and 2.9 percent to annual per capita GDP growth. This would contribute to a sustainable reduction in poverty”. In a more recent report the World Bank identified corruption as the main predicament against investment in Bangladesh. That corruption is a key predicament against good governance in Bangladesh is also beyond any dispute.

Civil servant corruption in Bangladesh

Corruption’s inherent bias against the poor is easily discernable in Bangladesh. While corruption affects everyone, the poor are more vulnerable especially because they are easy victims of bribery, extortion and intimidation. The poor in Bangladesh are directly affected by the increasing cost of key public services by way of unauthorized payments, low quality of such services and limiting or even preventing the Poor’s access to essential services as education, health and justice. As the following charts show access to such services has become a function of the capacity to make unauthorized payments.

Source: Calculated from, TI-Bangladesh, “Corruption in Bangladesh: A Household Survey 2004”, Dhaka, April 2005.

Drawn from the TIB Household Survey 2004 (released in April 2005), the first chart show that 36.5, 32.6, 21.8 and 54.1 percent of the households who received the four key selected categories of services in education – admission of kids to schools, enlistment for government stipend at primary level, enlistment for government stipend in secondary school, and disbursement of the stipend respectively - were forced to unauthorized payments. In the health sector, as the second chart shows, 29.3 percent of the surveyed households who received outdoor treatment were victims of corruption, whereas 54.8 percent of those who needed X-rays were victims. The third chart shows that 77.7, 79.2

and 60.6 percent of the households who had interactions with police had to pay bribes for filing of general diary (GD)/first information report (FIR), police clearance certificate and to avoid arrest respectively

Estimates from the same survey show that about 7.94 percent of the annual household income was eaten up by corruption in six selected sectors (education, health, land administration, police, justice and income tax).

Disaggregated by income categories, the bias against the poor are more evident. As the chart below shows, households in the low income category of Taka 72,000 per year lost 9.529 percent, whereas middle income group (TK. 72,000-140,000) lost 4.569 percent and high income group (Taka 140,000+) lost 2.384 percent of their annual income.

Recent years have witnessed a growing concern in Bangladesh regarding the role of police as the law enforcing agency. It is widely believed that the police have not only failed to arrest the deterioration of the law and order situation, but in many cases violation of law takes place with the connivance, if not participation of the police. Series of such accusations has tarnished their image as custodian of people’s safety and security. Media reports are replete with evidences of involvement of a section of police in abuse of power. Because of the growing intensity of such wrongdoing, the relatively rare examples of their good deeds get overshadowed.

Accusations against the police include harassment, extortion, bribery, arbitrary arrest, and custodial torture or even killings. It is a commonplace wisdom that hardly any police investigation takes place against law-breakers unless they are bribed up to their satisfaction. There are numerous evidences of unauthorized and extra-judicial harassment, torture and deaths in police custody including alleged killing of arrested individuals in “crossfire”. Alleged extra-judicial killing of the arrested and suspected criminals has indeed stepped into third generation. The first generation was during “Operation Clean Heart” by the army under debatable circumstances officially described as heart-failure, which was followed by the police in the form of “cross-fire” officially claiming that each time the apprehended criminals get killed while trying to escape from custody. The force Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) drawn from members of the police, army, air force, and paramilitary force with the special task of curbing crime then opted for a more conspicuous copy-book scenario of arrested persons being killed in cross-fire between the RAB and accomplices of the arrested. The authority claims that RAB has succeeded in improving law and order situation, a view not necessarily shared by all. While some arms have been recovered, over two hundred people were killed in a highly debatable condition. The majority of these deaths happened in the hands of RAB, others in the hands of police. These deaths sparked widespread criticism from the civil society and human rights organizations as well as the opposition political parties joined by development partner countries. There are also frequent media reports of extortion, robbery and collection of bribes under coercion or threats. The human rights organization Ain o Shalish Kendra has produced a chilling account of violations of the right to fair trial.

TI-Bangladesh’s analyses of its Corruption Database identified the police as the most corrupt sector for the last four consecutive years 2000-4.Household Corruption Surveys 2002 and 2005 have also identified this law-enforcing agency as the leading corrupt sector. The 2005 Household Corruption Survey estimated that the average rate of unauthorized payment for registering a General Diary (GD) with the police was 939 taka, that for FIR taka 2430, and for police clearance certificates taka 880 on an average. It was further estimated that the amount of bribe paid to the police by the households in a year was Taka 15,300 million.

Perception of corruption in Police is nothing new, nor is it TIB alone that have found corruption in police to be high. The World Bank concluded already in 1999 that the Bangladesh Police was “most corrupt”. A local non-government organization called Democracy Watch found that 97 percent of the people in Bangladesh considered police to be corrupt. The High Court, while delivering a verdict in a case made a statement that “people’s trust in police is gone”.

A Diagnostic Study on Police conducted by TIB showed that 91 percent of the people visiting the metropolitan police station to lodge complain of various types could not do so without paying bribe, while 97 percent of those visiting the detainees in the police station had to make unauthorized payments.

Victims of police corruption: Distribution by daily income category

A diagnostic study on the implications of Speedy Trial Tribunal Act 2002 found that one-

Fourth of the cases (25.3) lodged under this law were politically motivated, and political intervention aces place in more than one-third of cases filed under this law. Behind such intervention were exported to be the concerned Ministries and the ruling party. Political motivations behind legal cases are nothing exceptional, but intervention in the judicial process is unacceptable. Failure of successive governments to separate the judiciary from the executive is contributing to the lack of independence and effectiveness of the judiciary as well as erosion of public trust in this vital institution. More importantly, allegations were reported of enforcing unauthorized payments; especially room the defenders (67.6), while one-third of the complainants were also victims of corruption especially if the complaint came from outside the Government). Magistrates, lawyers and bench officers are the key persons collecting bribes promising bails and/or favourable verdicts. There is a growing impression in the public that with both police and lower judiciary affected by corruption the more people have to interact with them more is their possibility of being victims of corruption.

Again, on a closer look, poorer sections of the citizens are more severely affected by police corruption. Table 3 shows that 36 percent of those forced to make unofficial payments for police clearance certificates belonged to the income category of less than $1 daily income, whereas percent of those forced to pay bribes for First Information Report (FIR)/General Diary (GD), and 35.8 percent to avoid arrest were in the same daily income category. The percentage of victims of corruption in the daily income group of upto $2 was 76, 74 and 72.8 percent respectively. No less striking is the level of corruption in the lower judiciary which has been a subject of growing debate. Successive TIB analyses based on its Corruption Database have indicated considerable citizens concern about corruption in the lower judiciary. According to the 2005 household survey, 66 percent of the surveyed people who went to the courts had to pay bribes to the lower judiciary at an average rate of 6,135 taka. On the other hand, 64.58% of the accused had to make unauthorized payments at an average rate of 7,728 taka. Again, implications of corruption are much more severe for the people in the lower income strata. Table 4 below shows that 42.7 percent of the respondents who had to make unauthorized payments to judiciary were in the income range of below one dollar a day, 32.4 in the income category between one dollar and less than two dollars, and 24.9 belonged to daily income group of 3 plus dollars.

Victims of unauthorized payments to the judiciary: Distribution by daily income category

Further disaggregated by those who are directly affected by corruption in selected sectors, the ratio of loss is higher for all income categories. For instance those who were forced to make unauthorized payments to the Police, lost 9.39 percent of their annual household income; those having experience of bribery to the tax department paid 8.26 percent of their annual household income, while as high as 34.93 percent of annual household income of those affected by unauthorized payments to lower judiciary was lost on this account.

CONCLUSION

Public sector Corruption is a complex multi-faceted social phenomenon with innumerable manifestations. It takes place as an outcome of deficiencies in the existing public administration apparatuses and systems as well as cultural, economic, political and social factors.

Differences of opinion still exist as to the meaning of the terms of public sector corruption. This is primarily because individuals look at corruption from their own vantage points influenced by surrounding environment. But what is heartening is that in recent years public sector corruption is viewed from a much broader perspective rather than looking at it from moral and functional angles only. The causes of corruption are as varied as the phenomenon itself. Corruption results from the presence of a number of factors. Typologies have been offered to make a sense out of so many contributory factors.

There are many ways of public sector corruption. What transpires from such a categorization is that corruption can be sponsored by outsiders, resultant of political scandal, institutionalized and administrative malfeasance. The cost of public sector corruption has been enormous in terms of a country’s socio-political and Economic advancement. What has been conclusively demonstrated is that corruption has negative consequences on economic growth, administrative efficiency and political development.

Checking corruption is a crying need of today’s world. At the same time, it is understood that total eradication of corruption is not possible. But that does not mean in any way that corruption cannot be effectively contained. A number of recommendations have been offered as how to check corruption in a decisive manner. But what has been realized is that in order to drastically reduce corruption fundamental changes must be brought about without any delay or hesitation. Experiences of the Philippines, Uganda, Ghana and India have clearly indicated that corruption networks are extensive and cover within their realms public servants of all types. What is more alarming is that a rather cozy nexus exists among public servants and politicians in power to share the booties of corruption. Almost all efforts to contain corruption in these countries have been unsuccessful. On the other hand, experiences of Hong Kong and Singapore demonstrate in no uncertain terms that given political will and the institution of appropriate anti-corruption mechanisms incidence of corruption can be drastically contained. The root of corruption in Bangladesh runs deep in history. The existence of a patron-client relationship reinforces corrupt practices in all spheres of public dealing. Almost all political regimes in Bangladesh have been corrupt. Only the nature and extent of corruption varied depending on the nature of the regime, its key leader and his popular power base. Corruption in the public service is extensive and all-pervasive. Corruption in the political arena has emboldened public servants to become unabashedly corrupt and not bother about it at all. The prevalence of systematic corruption in Bangladesh society can be explained due to a number of factors. Lack of political will, lack of organized movement by civil society for a change in the status quo, and presence of a change-resistant institutional bureaucracy, lack of ethics in public life, absence of independence of judiciary and media, have all contributed in varying degrees to the continuance of large-scale and systematic public sector corruption in all spheres of Bangladeshi society.